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A B S T R A C T  
This essay highlights a few key considerations related to 
current developments in the field of immigration. It 
offers reflection on a recently published overview of 
Security Studies [Marton-Balogh-Rada: Biztonsági 
tanulmányok…; AJTK: Budapest, 2015], and the 
assessment therein of the challenges of migration, as a 
baseline of evaluation to be critically reviewed in light of 
recent events. Along with weaknesses of the present 
system of international burden-sharing related to 
refugee protection, the essay points out pros and cons as 
to whether a fundamental re-assessment of the situation 
is truly necessary, and concludes by asking some basic 
questions that ought to be answered before it is possible 
to strategically conceive of the road ahead. 
                                                          
1 The author benefited from the Bolyai János Research Scholarship of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences in conducting research for this essay. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 2 
In a recent overview and revision of the state of the art in the 
field of Security Studies this author has, together with co-authors 
István Balogh and Péter Rada, taken a critical position on the 
Copenhagen School’s perspective on societal security.1 Whilst the 
latter’s definition of societal security as “the ability of a society to 
persist in its essential character under changing conditions and 
possible or actual threats”2 leaves room for different 
interpretations, much of the academic discourse on the subject has 
focused on issues of identity, and came to see the security of 
collective identity as the primary determinant of a society’s 
security and immigration as a key threat to it. 
Without denying the importance of identity, even as one takes 
account of its elusive nature and the need to avoid an essentialist 
perspective of what is at its core, this approach to societal security 
may seem naturally more valid in the context of Western European 
countries experiencing large-scale immigration. This does not 
imply that in the case of Western Europe exaggerations do not 
permeate the discourse as to the dangers of immigration to 
collective identity and the true scale of the phenomenon: to the 
contrary, in our book we found that the number of immigrants does 
not at the present justify the expectation that indigenous 
populations will be in the minority any time soon in the countries 
concerned, and that consequently it is difficult to see collective 
identity as truly threatened in them. The actual contrast between 
Central-Eastern and Western Europe is that Central-Eastern 
Europe has not experienced immigration to the same extent in 
recent history, up till very recently. We thus thought it necessary 
to re-interpret the notion of societal security, and the above 
definition, given that much else other than immigration can 
generate a sense of insecurity in the societal realm. 
With a Central-Eastern European perspective, immigration 
promised to be an issue of lesser interest on our agenda. The region 
was, at the time of the writing of our book in 2014, clearly a source 
                                                          
2 Work on this article was closed at the end of August 2015 and the article in its 
present state reflects developments up to this point. 
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rather than a target of migration, with several hundred thousand 
Hungarian citizens working and living abroad, mostly in European 
Union member countries. We have also noted a clear trend of 
growth in trans-migration but assessed the long-term burden 
generated by this for Hungarian institutions as low given that 
migrants are near-exclusively interested in getting into a few rich, 
economically strong countries such as Germany, the Netherlands 
or the United Kingdom, and thus do not stay in Hungary. At the 
same time we maintained that refugee flows are largely contained 
in the regions immediately neighbouring on source countries and 
that consequently the refugee issue may be “over-securitised” in 
Western European countries. 
In the wake of the influx of a great number of people from Kosovo 
at the beginning of 2015, the continued experience of a surge in the 
number of migrants from other places in the wake of this wave, the 
rise of anti-immigration organisations, parties and popular 
sentiment across Europe, the decision to erect a security fence 
along a section of Hungary’s southern border (the border with 
Serbia), the declaration of a state of emergency in parts of 
Macedonia during the summer of 2015, along with the visible 
breakdown of measures that were meant to stem the tide of trans-
migration there – a string of these and other developments – the 
time seems to have come for a fundamental re-assessment of the 
above position on immigration. A crisis after all is a situation where 
extraordinary steps may be necessary; where changes in existing 
practices and policies may be called for. 
This brief essay does not attempt to provide a comprehensive 
and decisive answer as to what is necessary in the present state of 
affairs. Inasmuch as it has a normative aim, it is to inspire a more 
sober, empirically informed discussion of the subject – in particular 
the questions of how much refugee flows continue to be contained, 
what share of European populations refugees and other 
immigrants constitute, what imminent dangers the present 
situation may pose, and what all of this implies from the point of 
view of international (including intra-EU) burden-sharing. 
T H E  R E F U G E E  P I P E L I N E  
The share of developing countries (i.e. Low or Middle Income 
Countries) in hosting refugees grew from 70% to 86% in the decade 
between 2004 and 2014.3 Syria has become the top source in the 
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course of 2014, overtaking Afghanistan, and per consequence of 
this, countries neighbouring Syria have become the countries 
hosting the largest number of refugees – especially Turkey, with 
1.59 million refugees, and Lebanon, with 1.15 million as of end-
2014.  
There was a total of 19.5 million refugees worldwide in 2014 
according to UNHCR. This represented a significant increase of 
14.8% over the previous year. The rise was also reflected in the 
number of internally displaced persons – among other conflicts, 
developments in Iraq and Syria account for this as well.4 
Whilst in UNHCR’s figures the top nine host countries (Turkey, 
Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Chad, and 
Uganda) are clearly countries neighbouring on the source regions, 
as our aforementioned analysis assumed as well, one should keep 
in mind that these populations exist per definition in extraordinary 
circumstances in places where administrative capacities may be 
limited. To assume that exactly these numbers of people would stay 
in place in their locations, as registered by UNHCR or national 
authorities, would be in all likelihood erroneous. Even though 
refugee flows have been historically contained in regions in the 
direct vicinity of conflict zones, and this continues to be the case 
even today, any rise in the number of internally and externally 
displaced may translate into a rise in the (smaller) number of 
people who venture further abroad in an attempt to join more 
distant diaspora groups in rich countries. The population 
concerned may in effect be imagined as moving along a pipeline, 
given that transit countries are largely inconvenient destinations 
for the refugees.3 
The pipeline metaphor may facilitate understanding that the 
burden taken by Germany (in terms of the number of people hosted) 
cannot be larger than the burden originally taken by countries such 
as Turkey. The transitory burden taken by Hungary similarly 
cannot be larger than the burden taken at an earlier point in time 
by Greece. This is true even as migrants from different sources also 
join the movement of people between Turkey and Europe. They 
enter the pipeline upstream and arrive at a point downstream later 
on. Peak presence downstream cannot exceed the peak upstream. 
                                                          
3 This is why the idea of introducing EU-wide country quotas is bound to fail. Refugees 
and other migrants are interested in going to specific countries, and are unlikely to stay 
in a country chosen for them by bureaucratic actors. 
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This is relevant in that refugee migration – while it often 
appears in public discourse as a process fed by a limitless reservoir 
of migrants – does in fact have a human reserve of a measurable 
size. It is of course concerning that these reserves may grow in the 
case of continued conflict just as it is a possibility that an increasing 
share of the displaced population hosted by Turkey and other 
countries may decide in favour of moving towards Germany. Still, 
in terms of the number of refugees compared to GDP per capita, the 
largest burden for now clearly falls on comparatively poorer 
countries (Ethiopia, Pakistan, Chad, Uganda and Kenya are the 
top five hosts in the world in this respect). Per population the 
largest burden is taken by Lebanon and Jordan. 
Germany, a country of 81 million people, with a GDP of $3.8 
trillion, received only 19,200 claims from asylum-seekers in 2007. 
This has risen to 109,600 by 2013 and further to 173,100 in 2014. 
Against a backdrop of up to 800,000 asylum requests expected in 
Germany in 2015 in total,5 the country has, by the month of August, 
received double the number of asylum seekers in 2014.6 Projecting 
from these August figures, a proportionate estimate would indicate 
the likely arrival of over 0.5 million people by year’s end. Given that 
there seems to be an accelerated increase in the influx of new 
migrants an even higher number (closer to the 800,000 figure) 
cannot be ruled out. At the same time, other countries, such as, for 
instance, Sweden, have also been receiving a growing number of 
applications. Sweden saw 75,100 asylum requests in 2014. 
To make sense of these numbers: Just as it is reasonable to 
expect that Syria will never become completely deserted of people, 
and that all refugees will not leave neighbouring countries such as 
Turkey, it is sensible to expect that the majority of those who have 
made their way to Germany, Sweden or other EU destination 
countries will eventually permanently stay where they are. 
The rich core of the European Union thus clearly serves as a 
magnet, exerting a strong pull, and the transit countries that 
experience the movement of migrants headed their way are in a 
dependent position vis-à-vis policy choices by this EU core. Should 
Germany or other countries decide in favour of a stricter asylum 
policy and/or stronger border control measures (along with a 
revision of the Schengen regime), the current transit countries 
would be facing a challenge of a new nature. This is a concern even 
if Germany for now seems to be moving in the opposite direction, 
indicating an increased readiness to host refugees from Syria.7 
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Such signals are not entirely reassuring as in the meantime 
Germany is still pushing for the introduction of mandatory hosting 
quotas and a common list of safe countries to which refugees may 
be deported – such a list would presumably include EU member 
states and among them Hungary, too. 
Even with the transitory presence of migrants in their territory, 
countries of transit are already taking a significant burden (again, 
especially with measures of GDP and population in mind), and 
already the present level of exposure to the challenges of a 
protracted refugee situation has proven sufficient to evoke 
attempts from their part to escape some of this burden by diverting 
the flow of migrants towards other countries.8 A country such as 
Hungary finds itself in the difficult situation of standing to be 
criticised either for trying to impede the movement of legitimate 
refugees or for inadequately protecting the borders of the Schengen 
Zone. 
It seems on the basis of this overview that even as there is no 
certainty in all of the numbers (e.g. when it comes to estimates of 
the displaced in locales in Turkey or Lebanon), refugee flows are 
clearly more weakly contained than before. This has come about as 
gradual change – hence the accelerating tempo of the influx. 
Factors playing an important role in this transformation include 
that in the case at hand an extraordinarily large number of 
refugees found itself in a protracted refugee situation nearer to the 
rich core areas of Europe than in any other case before (with the 
exception of the crisis in the Balkans in the 1990s). Poor camp 
conditions in the countries of first asylum, which still continue to 
carry the (by far) greater burden as of August 2015, are also 
conducive to refugees’ departure. As UNHCR recently indicated, its 
funding request for its Syria program has been met to only 33% by 
donors.9 If European countries are interested in avoiding the 
arrival of more refugees, more could be done in this respect.  
Moreover, more not only could but should be done, on the 
grounds of considerations of equity as well. The present 
international practice in the protection of refugees puts a 
disproportionate share of the burden on the countries of first 
asylum. For example, as recently as in January 2014 Germany was 
offering a mere 11,000 slots for refugee re-settlement for refugees 
from Syria – ironically, given that they may easily end up with as 
much as several dozen times that many Syrian refugees eventually. 
This clearly indicates the naiveté of sticking to the present 
16 BIZTPOL AFFAIRS Vol. 3.:2 2015 
 
approach whereby little in re-settlement options and similarly little 
in funding for the countries of first asylum is formally offered by 
the international community. The result may be that countries that 
do not consider themselves overly interested in refugees may in the 
end find that refugees will be all the more interested in them. That 
those attracting most of the influx can then attempt to burden 
countries on the periphery of the European Union with the task of 
slowing down and temporarily housing refugee flows and with the 
prospect of quota-based repatriation schemes, citing the Dublin 
arrangement as a source of responsibility for these states, is no 
substitute for a global solution to a challenge in which even Gulf, 
Asian and North American countries might be expected to share. 
Not all asylum seekers originate from Syria or other countries in 
conflict, it is important to add. Of the 340,000 who arrived in 
Germany so far this year only 44,000 were Syrian nationals.10 A 
significant number of people came from countries far more 
complicated to assess with a view to entitlement to asylum, such as 
Pakistan, China, Nigeria, Iran,4 or from places where clearly 
economic factors dominated migrants’ calculations, such as Kosovo. 
The refugee pipeline’s infrastructure is available due to other 
movements of people and this ought to have policy implications as 
well. 
C O N C E R N I N G  I M P L I C A T I O N S  O F  T H E  
P R E S E N T  S I T U A T I O N  
Even the numbers at the present point only towards a future of 
slow demographic transformation where, more distantly than gut 
assessments have it, Europe’s societies become merely more 
heterogeneous rather than dominated by a single immigrant ethnic 
group. In the United States, where popular discourse similarly 
reckons with the prospects of a fundamental demographic shift, 
and some expect the U.S. to become the largest “Latin-American” 
country one day, the Pew Research Center projects that Hispanics 
would constitute only 29% of the population by 2050;11 it is also 
worth adding that the so-called “Hispanic” population is no less 
heterogeneous than Europe’s immigrants are.  
                                                          
4 Armed conflict causes displacement in both Nigeria and Pakistan. It is nevertheless 
questionable if the entirety of these countries’ territory can be legitimately regarded as 
unsafe or if groups of the displaced. 
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Greatly differing fertility rates may seemingly logically point to 
a distant future in Europe where “indigenous” populations may 
lose their majority hold but it is worth keeping in mind that the 
official immigrant population in most of the Europan Union does 
not currently exceed 1% of society.12 Besides immigrants there may 
be others of foreign origin (including illegally) in a country, of 
course, and the children of previous generations of immigrants may 
also count in the case of poorly integrated segments of immigrant 
communities.5 Still, the numbers are lower than assumed. It is the 
currently (spectacularly) accelerating influx and the wild 
assumption of an endless human reserve waiting to migrate in its 
wake that makes people think and expect otherwise. In the 
meantime, Eurostat still warns, for its part, that “migration alone 
will almost certainly not reverse the ongoing trend of population 
ageing experienced in many parts of the EU.”13 
This does not mean that on the micro level of urban and rural 
communities or on the macro level of national domestic politics 
immigration cannot lead to problems. The rise of far-right political 
forces is one way in which indigenous populations are seeking to 
escape the feared consequences of continued immigration. 
Meanwhile, an economy offering less attractive prospects than a 
decade ago, pressure on state welfare services and benefits, and the 
ethnic balance in specific locales may aggravate intergroup 
tensions on the level of individual communities where a 
demographic shift may be much more real and visible than overall 
in Europe. Violent protests and even rioting may occur with 
increasing frequency, with the involvement of anti-immigration 
groups as well as settled and recently arrived immigrant 
communities. This is a concern for transit countries, too, where 
especially the coming winter times may very soon prove to be a 
major challenge in handling trans-migration. 
I N  C O N C L U S I O N  
Given that, as pointed out before, a significant part of the 
current flow of migrants is not strictly speaking part of the refugee 
pipeline as such, any solutions sought have to lie partly outside 
                                                          
5 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) thus 
presents higher figures for “foreign populations” from its part. See at 
https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-population.htm (accessed: 18 September 
2015). 
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conceivable improvements to the refugee regime hinted at above. 
There can be no silver bullet as the variables that may affect the 
flow of migrants from their source countries are diverse and very 
different from one country to the other. They are not very easy to 
strategically manipulate, either. Development aid, for example, 
cannot realistically be expected to achieve direct results in this 
respect. Also, people who are determined to make the perilous 
journey to Europe under the presently known conditions cannot 
easily be hindered in this.6 
It may be some consolation to those concerned about the impact 
of immigration that it is a complex system – one where changing 
conditions form an important input to which the system reacts as 
an organism. If economic prospects truly become worse at the 
destination, the flow of migrants eventually adjusts. 
This, in fact, is the uncertain bottomline of the Great 
Immigration Crisis. Do refugees and migrants constitute, as 
unambiguously as is often voiced in public discourse, a “burden,” 
and their arrival a “crisis,” if Europe’s economy and ageing societies 
continue to need them? Or does the challenge lie rather in 
managing the influx so that some of the actually negative 
consequences can be partly or wholly avoided? 
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